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Abstract. Payment cards make use of a Primary Account Number (PAN) that
is normally used by merchants to uniquely identify users, and if necessary
to deny users service by blacklisting. However, tokenisation is a technique
whereby the PAN is replaced by a temporary equivalent, for use in mobile de-
vices that emulate payment cards, but with reduced attack resistance. This
paper outlines how tokenised payments contradict the process of blacklist-
ing in open transport systems. We propose the use of a linkable group signa-
ture to link different transactions by a user regardless of the variable token.
This allows the transport operator to check if a user’s signature is linked to
a previous dishonest transaction in the blacklist, while still maintaining the
anonymity of the user.
1 Introduction
Card payments rely on the high levels of security and tamper-resistance provided by
the chip embedded in the bank card. The chip provides secure storage for sensitive
credentials such as the Primary Account Number (PAN) [1], as well as performing
cryptographic operations. More recently, the use of contactless payments has risen
significantly. There are now more than 81 million contactless bank cards on issue
in the UK alone [2]. Contactless payments are quick and typically do not require
cardholder verification, which makes them suitable for low value transactions. This
opens up new use-cases for contactless payments such as transport. Major Trans-
port Operators (TrOs) such as Transport for London (TfL) and the Utah Transit Au-
thority (UTA) have moved from using proprietary smart card solutions exclusively,
to accepting contactless credit/debit bank cards already in the user’s possession.
This model is generally referred to as the ‘Open Ticketing Model’. In open ticketing,
the TrO typically relies on the PAN of the user, to determine the points of entry and
exit that make up a complete journey.
In addition, by already having the infrastructure (terminals) to accept contact-
less bank cards, TrOs can also accept payments by Near Field Communication
(NFC)-enabled devices with minimal or no changes. This is because both contact-
less cards and NFC devices comply with the ISO/IEC 14443 standards [3]. In fact, a
terminal sees an NFC device in card emulation mode as if it were a regular contact-
less card. In this paper we focus on NFC device-based payments in transport.
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Traditionally, an NFC device in card emulation mode relies on the Secure Ele-
ment (SE) for enhanced security. It was envisaged that the host Operating System
(OS) cannot guarantee the levels of security required by applications such as pay-
ment and transport. The SE is a small hardware tamper-resistant chip similar to the
chip in a bank card in terms of functionality. The SE is typically embedded in the
device, but could also be realised using the SIM card or an external memory card.
The NFC controller routes messages received from a terminal to an application in
the SE. The SE is tightly controlled by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
or by the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) in the case of a SIM card. This means
only they can dictate who can provision an application on the SE and will usually
charge a fee to do so. This adds an extra cost to NFC-based payments and adds to
the complexity of the ecosystem.
However, Host-based Card Emulation (HCE) offers a drastic alternative to card
emulation with an SE. HCE was first introduced by Cyanogenmod [4] and more no-
tably by Google on Android 4.4 (KitKat) [5] onwards. It lets an application on the
OS emulate a smart card. The NFC controller here routes messages directly to the
application, bypassing the OS. Therefore security is traded for flexibility, because
the guarantees of hardware-backed security are lost.
Different techniques have been proposed to manage the risk of HCE’s reliance
on software and make it acceptably secure for payments. More details in terms of
the feasibility of these approaches as well their pros and cons can be found in [6].
Of significance to this paper is tokenisation. The idea of tokenisation is to replace
the PAN in the user’s device with a surrogate value that has a shorter life-span than
the original PAN.
1.1 Problem Statement
The PAN has evolved from being just an account reference of the user. Merchants,
in this case TrOs, rely on the PAN as a static value to uniquely identify users, and
consequently blacklist them [7] [8]. However, in the case of tokenised payments, it
is paradoxical for a merchant to rely on a non-static token for blacklisting. We high-
light how tokenised payments in transport call into question the ability to blacklist
dishonest users on the transport network. This variability in ‘identity’ exposes the
TrO to attacks similar to the Sybil attack [9]. This is a potential problem for both aca-
demic proposals and real life implementations that rely on a static value to identify
or distinguish users.
1.2 Proposed Solution
In this paper, we use linkable group digital signatures to propose a solution to the
blacklisting problem [10] [11]. Linkable signatures have a property that lets a ver-
ifier link the signatures of a user on different messages, anonymously. We rely on
the ‘linkability’ property to blacklist dishonest users, regardless of their non-static
token. We also exploit the anonymity provided by the linkable signature, which is
an important requirement for transport ticketing systems. Dishonest user in this
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paper refers to a user travelling with no funds in the account, or an attacker using
a stolen or compromised device. We are able to blacklist users regardless of their
short-lived tokens while maintaining user anonymity. We test the feasibility of our
solution by implementing it on an NFC mobile device.
1.3 Related Work
The work in [12] evaluates open ticketing using TfL and the Chicago Transit Author-
ity (CTA) as case studies. The author mainly focused on the theoretical aspects of
adoption, such as the issue of unbanked riders. In [13], linkable group signatures
were used to detect the double usage of tickets; however, their proposal was based
on a closed model and tickets were purchased well before the travel. To the best
of our knowledge, the only academic open ticketing proposal is [14]. The authors
proposed the use of bank cards and, specifically, using the PAN to identify users.
However, the authors rely on Certificate Revocation List (CRL) to blacklist dishon-
est users. We shall discuss the problems with using CRLs below.
2 Transport Ticketing Systems
Transport ticketing systems can be classified into two broad categories: closed and
open ticketing systems. Closed ticketing systems are proprietary systems that are
typically ‘card/device centric’; i.e. the card holds the logic, tickets, transaction value
and other accounting related data used in the calculation of fares. In this model, the
TrO is essentially its own ‘bank’. Notable examples are the London Oyster card and
the Hong Kong Octopus card. However, this paper focuses on the open ticketing
systems described in more detail below.
2.1 Open Ticketing Systems
Open systems rely on the well established global payment infrastructure. This means
users can make travel payments with contactless cards, mobile applications issued
by the bank cards, or even digital wallets. Therefore the TrO in this model accepts
payments like any other merchant. The TrO saves the cost of issuing the cards and
managing the card system. It is considered that almost 10% of revenue generated
on the London transport network goes to managing the Oyster card system [15].
Open ticketing can be realised in different ways. To that effect, the UK Cards As-
sociation (UKCA)1 has designed a framework that outlines three contactless tick-
eting models as agreed by the card and transit industries [16]. This paper focuses
on the ‘Aggregated Pay As You Go’ model. In this model, the payment device is used
multiple times and the price is not known at the beginning of the journey. Each us-
age of the device in a day is acknowledged and later aggregated at the back-office to
determine the fare to be charged; and subsequently request for payments from the
1 "The UK Cards Association is the trade body for the card payments industry in the UK,
representing financial institutions which act as card issuers and acquirers"
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user’s bank through the payment network. It is important to highlight the concept
of delayed authorisation of payments as it forms the basis upon which the aggre-
gated pay as you go model relies.
In delayed authorisation, instead of requesting authorisation for every transac-
tion as usual, the TrO only acknowledges the usage of the user’s device at various
points on the transport network (also known as a TAP) and sends the TAPs to the
back-office. At the back office, all TAPs by the same user are aggregated at the end of
the day. And only then does the TrO request for authorisation of funds. The appar-
ent risk here is that a dishonest user can travel with no funds in the account since
authorisation is not done at the time of travel. We refer to this as the ‘first time travel
risk’. Currently, this risk is negotiated and accepted between the TrO and the bank
issuers [16].
2.2 Blacklisting in Transport Ticketing
With over £200 million lost by UK transport operators in revenue due to dishonest
users [17], blacklisting is an essential requirement for ticketing systems. Blacklisting
becomes even more important for systems that rely on delayed authorisation due to
’first time travel risk’. This gives the TrO monetary incentives to deny the user travel
until outstanding payments and possibly fines are settled. Therefore, a blacklisting
solution must be able to uniquely identify a dishonest user and subsequently deny
travel. In open ticketing, the two unique values that could potentially be used for
blacklisting are the user’s public keys through CRLs, or the PAN. Earlier solutions
[14] have relied on CRLs. However, the use of CRLs for real life implementations has
its challenges, the distribution of CRLs to merchants faces problems of efficiency.
Furthermore, due to the strict timing requirements of transport ticketing systems,
the look-up times of CRLs may prove to be too high. Also, with a huge number of
transactions, it is impossible to update CRLs in an efficient way. More on CRLs can
be found in [18].
2.3 EMV Payment Tokenisation
Tokenisation replaces the PAN with a short-lived surrogate value referred to as a
‘token’ [19]. The idea is to eliminate sensitive cardholder information, specifically
the PAN, from the payment device as well as merchant terminals and replace it with
a token. If the device is compromised, the token will be of minimal importance as
it is only valid for a short time. EMVCo2 has released a specification on the use of
tokenisation for mobile payments [19].
EMVco introduces a new entity to the existing payment network known as the
Token Service Provider (TSP). The TSP is responsible for generating, issuing, and
provisioning payment tokens to legitimate token requests. The TSP is also responsi-
ble for maintaining the PAN-token mapping in the token vault, as well as the trans-
lation of PAN-token to legitimate requests. Fig 1 above shows the transaction flow
2 EMVCo, made up of six members; American Express, Discover, JCB, MasterCard, Union-
Pay, and Visa, facilitates worldwide interoperability and acceptance of secure payment
transactions.
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Fig. 1. Diagram Showing the Transaction Flow of a Tokenised Payment
in an EMV tokenised transaction. Methods of verifying the legitimacy of these re-
quests, the token generation methods, and the way in which these tokens are pro-
visioned to the device are out of the scope of this paper. We assume tokens will be
generated and provisioned using global best practices. Also the validity period of
tokens is out of scope; the amount of time for which a token is valid should be de-
termined based on the perceived risk level.
3 Linkable Group Digital Signatures
Group signatures as first proposed by Chaum in [20] allow any member of a par-
ticular group to generate signatures anonymously. The verifier gets cryptographic
assurances that a legitimate member of the group signed the message without re-
vealing the signer’s identity.
Group signatures with different properties have been proposed in the literature.
In this paper, we use the linkable group signature first proposed in [11] (referred to
as a list signature) and standardised by ISO/IEC in [10]. In its original construction,
the signature supports linking signatures provided they were signed using the same
linking tag. In [11] a time frame was used as the linking tag, allowing the linking of
all signatures generated by a user within a given time frame. However, [10] shows
the linking tag can also be any random value, as long as it is constant. This signature
also supports revocation in case of dishonest users; it supports both private key re-
vocation and verifier blacklist revocation. In the section below, we give an overview
of the processes involved in this signature. For a detailed outline of the process and
mathematical proofs, please refer to [10, 11].
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3.1 Intractability Solutions
Strong RSA Assumption. First introduced in [21]; Let p ′ and q ′ be two distinct
primes of equal length such that: p = 2p ′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1 are also primes. The
multiplicative group of quadratic residues modulo n denoted by Q R (n ), is a cyclic
group of order p ′q ′. Where n = p q , and is referred to as safe RSA modulus.
Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumption(DDH). Let g be the generator of a finite
cyclic group G. The DDH assumption for group G states that it is hard to distin-
guish the DDH tuple: (g x , g y , g x y ) from random triples (g x , g y , g z ), for a random
(x , y , z ) modulo the order of group G .
In general, the DDH problem can also be constructed for arbitrary finite abelian
groups. Therefore, if G =Q R (n ), then G has composite order. If the group compo-
sition of G is known, then the DDH problem in G is reduced to the DDH problem
in the components of G.
Notation Meaning
Tk Token generated from the PAN
t n t Timestamp at the point of entry
t x t Timestamp at the point of exit
t X Timestamp at the point of exit or entry
R n Random nonce
s t n i d Unique train station identity
S i g x {} linkable signature with key x
b s n linking base
T4 linking tag
A, e , x signature key
Gp k group public key = (n , a , a0, g , h , b )
Gm k group membership issuing key = (p’, q’)
C H AL L {tn t /tx t ||Rn ||s t ni d }
T AP {tn t /tx t ||Rn ||s t ni d ||Tk ||T4}
Table 1. Notations and Meanings
3.2 Phases
Below we describe the phases involved in a linkable group signature. We maintain
the notations used in [10] and their meanings are given in Table 1 above.
1. Key Generation Phase: The key generation is made up of two parts: Setup phase
and the group membership issuing phase. In the setup phase, the Group Mem-
bership Issuer (GMI) creates the group public parameter, Gp k , and Gmk . The
group membership issuing process is a protocol run between the GMI and a
group member to create a unique signature key (A, e , x ), where (x ) is the pri-
vate key and (A, e ) is the group membership certificate for each group member.
We assume the presence of a secure channel between the group member and
the GMI.
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a) Setup Phase We assume the existence of two hash functions H and HΓ such
that : 0, 1∗ → 0, 1k and HΓ : 0, 1→ 0, 12l p The GM chooses the group public
parameters:lp , k , lx , le , lE , lX ,ε. GM also chooses random generators: a , a0, g , h , b
of QR(n). Gp k = (n , a , a0, g , h , b ) and Gmk = (p’, q’)
b) Group Membership Issuing Phase At the end of this phase, the member
knows a random x ∈ [0, 2l x −1] and the manager knows a x mod n and noth-
ing more. Then the manager chooses a random prime e ∈ [2l E −2l e +1] and
computes A= (a0C2)d 1 mod n where C2 = a x mod n and d1 = 1/e mod n. The
manager sends A and e to the member. The member checks that Ae = a0a x
mod n. The group member signature key is (A, e , x ) and x is the private key.
2. Signing Phase: The signature process takes as input; the (Gp k ), the group mem-
ber signature key (A, e , x ), a linking base (bsn) and the message to be signed and
outputs a linkable signature Si g x .
Algorithm 1 Signing
1: Compute f = (HΓ (b s n ))2 (mod n)
2: Chooses random integers: w1, w2, w3 ∈ [0, 22l p −1]
3: Compute: T1 = Ab w 1 (mod n),
T2 = g w 1h w 2 (mod n),
T3 = g e h w 3 (mod n),
T4 = f x (mod n).
4: Choose random integers:
r1 ∈ [0, 2ε(l e +k )−1],
r2 ∈ [0, 2ε(l x+k )−1],
r3, r4, r5 ∈ [0, 2ε(l p+k )−1]
5: Choose random integers: r9, r10 ∈ [0, 2ε(2l p+l e +k )−1]
6: Compute: d1 = T r 11 /(a
r 2b r 9) (mod n)
d2 = T r 12 /(g
r 9h r 10) (mod n)
d3 = g r 3h r 4 (mod n)
d4 = g r 1h r 5 (mod n)
d5 = f r 2 (mod n)
7: Compute:
c = H(a ||a0||g ||h ||T1||T2||T3||T4||d1||...d5||m)
s1 = r1− c (e −2l E ), s2 = r2− c (x −2l X ),
s3 = r3− c w1, s4 = r4− c w2,
s5 = r5− c w3, s9 = r9− c e w1,
s10 = r10− c e w2
8: Set the signature as
Si g x = (c , s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s9, s10, T1, T2, T3, T4)
3. Verification Phase: The verification process takes as input a message, b s n , a
linkable signature, and Gp k corresponding to the group of the signer. It returns
1 if the signature is VALID, else it returns 0.
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Algorithm 2 Verification
1: computes:
f = HΓ (b s n ))2 (mod n)
t1 = a c0 T
s 1−c l ′
1 /(a
s 2−c L b s 9) (mod n) where l ′ = 2l E a nd L = 2l X
t2 = T
s1−c l ′
2 /(g
s 9h s 10) (mod n) where l ′ = 2l E
t3 = T c2 g
s 3h s 4 (mod n)
t4 = T c3 g
s 1−c l ′h s 5 (mod n) where l ′ = 2l E
t5 = T c4 f
s 2−c L (mod n) where L = 2l X
2: computes:
c’ = H(a ||a0||g ||h ||T1||T2||T3||T4||d1||d2||d3||d4||d5||m) If
c’=c, s1 ∈ [−2l e +k , 2ε(l e +k )−1],
s2 ∈ [−2l x+k , 2ε(l x+k )−1],
s3 ∈ [−22l p+k , 2ε(2l p+k )−1],
s4 ∈ [−22l p+k , 2ε(2l p+k )−1],
s5 ∈ [−22l p+k , 2ε(2l p+k )−1],
s9 ∈ [−22l p+l e +k , 2ε(2l p+l e +k )−1],
s10 ∈ [−2l p+l e +k , 2ε(2l p+l e +k ) − 1] return 1 (valid signature) else return 0 (invalid
signature)
4. Linking Phase: The linking process takes two valid linkable signatures and de-
termines if they are linked, i.e. if they were signed by the same user.
Algorithm 3 Linking
Takes two valid linkable signatures:
(c , s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s9, s10, T1, T2, T3, T4) and
(c ′, s ′1, s ′2, s ′3, s ′4, s ′5, s ′9, s10′ , T ′1 , T ′2 , T ′3 , T ′4 )) If T4 = T ′4 output 1 i.e they are linked, oth-
erwise 0
5. Revocation Phase: The original construction of the signature supports two types
of revocation: Private Key Revocation and Verifier Blacklist Revocation. In this pa-
per we focus on the latter. In verifier blacklist revocation, the verifier generates
a blacklist using T4. So if the verifier needs to blacklist a dishonest signer, the
signer’s T4 is added to the blacklist. Therefore the verifier can check if future sig-
natures by the same signer are revoked by checking as follows: for each T4’, check
T4’ 6= T4. If any of the checks fail, output 0 (revoked), else, output 1 (valid).
4 Transport Ticketing Requirements and Adversary Model
Transport ticketing systems have both functional and security requirements. A gen-
eral survey of electronic ticketing requirements can be found in [22]. Open ticketing
models, however have fewer requirements than closed systems because most of the
logic and fare calculation is moved to the back-office. We outline the requirements
below. We also explain the capabilities and motivations of a determined adversary.
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4.1 Adversary Model
The motivation for an adversary here is to abuse the ‘first time travel risk’ men-
tioned in section 2.1 above by maliciously, evading detection on the blacklist. The
adversary could either be an attacker in possession of a stolen device, or a legiti-
mate user trying to cheat the system. A determined attacker will try to avoid the
blacklisting mechanism by producing a signature with a fake linking tag. Accord-
ing to the described Adversary model, we list the presumptive capabilities of the
attacker below:
1. The attacker cannot break the linkable signature algorithm used in this paper.
2. The attacker is active, and can generate fake tokens and linking tags.
3. The attacker has access to the payment device, as well as a legitimate signing
key.
4.2 Functional Requirements
1. Offline Verification: It should be possible to validate offline if the user is allowed
to travel. This is because network connectivity cannot be guaranteed in some
areas such as underground stations. Connecting to a back-end will also intro-
duce latency to the overall transaction speed.
2. Efficiency: Transport ticketing systems should be very efficient in terms of pas-
senger throughput. Therefore they are required to produce transaction speeds
of 300–500 milliseconds from the time the user taps the device to the time the
terminal grants or rejects access.
4.3 Security Requirements
1. Integrity: It should be possible to verify if a wrong ticketing credential is used.
There should also be cryptographic evidence binding the user’s transaction to
a location at a particular time.
2. Anonymity: Although more of a privacy concern, the identity of the users of a
transport system must not be revealed.
3. Exculpability: It should be impossible for any entity, including the group man-
ager to falsely accuse a user of making a transaction at an entry or exit point on
the transport network.
4. Blacklistability: It should be possible to build a blacklist of dishonest users (or
compromised devices), and be able to deny them further usage of the transport
network.
5 Proposed Model
In this section, we outline the general architecture of our proposed model. We de-
fine the entities involved, as well as the roles played by each entity. We also highlight
the general assumptions made which form the basis of our proposed model.
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Device Terminal Back-Office TSP
{tn t /tx t ||Rn ||s t ni d }
1
Si g x {{tn t /tx t ||Rn ||s t ni d } ||Tk }||Tk
2
verifySig
checkBlacklist
SU C C E SS
3
T AP {tn t /tx t ||Rn ||s t ni d ||Tk ||T4}
4
TAPs Aggregation,
Fare Calculation
p a y R e q
5
p a y R e s p
6
U p d a t e Bl a c k l i s t
7
Fig. 2. Sequence Diagram Showing the Protocol of the Proposed Solution
We propose an open transport ticketing model which relies on EMV tokens pro-
visioned to NFC devices. The protocol makes use of linkable digital signatures.
Linkable digital signatures provide security features suitable for open transport
ticketing models. By correctly verifying a user’s signature, the TrO has assurance
that the user belongs to a known group. More importantly for this paper, we use
linkable signatures to solve the problem of blacklisting in tokenised payments. In
case of a dishonest user, the TrO is able to link the signatures of the user on different
tokens, while maintaining the anonymity of the user. Fig 5. shows the sequence of
messages exchanged in the proposed protocol.
5.1 Assumptions
1. The transport application, and credentials including cryptographic material,
shall be provisioned to the user’s device using secure best practices such as us-
ing GlobalPlatform.
2. The payment networks act as TSPs, and shall subject users to necessary identi-
fication and verification (ID&V) prior to issuing new tokens.
3. Each user is part of a group of users depending on their payment network. For
example, all MasterCard users are part of the same group.
4. The validity of the token in this paper is at least seven days.
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5. We assume the maximum security features available via the platform/OS will
be in place to store tokens, keys, and other cryptographic material. Therefore,
in reality, the validity of the token will be based on the perceived residual risk.
6. The user is in possession of an NFC device with a payment application used for
regular tokenised payments such as retail.
7. There is mutual trust between the TrO and the rest of the EMV ecosystem, and
the terminals will be provided with the group public keys of the payment net-
work.
8. Each train station has entry and exit gates, equipped with a terminal and a turn-
stile to grant or deny entry.
5.2 Entities
Below we describe the functions of the entities that make up the architecture of the
proposed model.
User: A user in this context will already have a bank account and possibly a bank
card. The user also has a NFC-enabled mobile device as well as a payment applica-
tion provisioned to the device.
Transport Operator: The TrO is in charge of validating users before travel. The
TrO also aggregates TAPs at the end of each day in the back-office to determine the
fare, and subsequently apply for authorisation from the user’s bank via the payment
network. The TrO shall also maintain a blacklist of dishonest users in cases where
the user has insufficient funds or in the case of a compromise.
Payment Networks: The payment networks will also serve as the TSP, and are in
charge of provisioning new tokens to the users device, translating tokens back to
PANs, and subsequently facilitating the authorisation of payments. The rationale
behind the decision to use the payment network as the TSP is due to the fact that
there are fewer payment networks globally, than banks3. Therefore this means that
the TrO’s terminal will have to keep a few group public keys for signature verifica-
tion.
5.3 Phases
Our solution is divided into 4 phases: the setup phase, validation phase, account-
ing phase and the blacklisting phase. The specifics of the accounting phase are out
of the scope of this paper. It is however important to mention as it precedes the
blacklisting phase.
3 The EMVco specification on tokenisation indicates that the payment networks can addi-
tionally act as the TSP, while still maintaining their primary roles in the EMV ecosystem
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Setup Phase: This phase is executed between a user and the payment network. A
user initiates this phase by opting to use the payment application on his device for
transport payments. They both engage in an ID&V process to verify the user’s iden-
tity and bank account, and check if the user’s has any outstanding transport fares.
The process is terminated if any of the checks fail. Otherwise they go through the
key generation process as explained in section 1b. In the end, the user will have a
unique signature key; (A, e , x ), a token (Tk ), and a TrO-specific (b s n). We assume
the TSPs group public keys to be well known and are provided to the TrOs well be-
fore hand.
Validation Phase: This phase is illustrated in Fig5. We see that a user taps the device
on a terminal at a train station, the terminal sends a challenge to the user. Challenge
includes; timestamp (tX ), random nonce (Rn ) and the station ID (s t ni d ). User con-
catenates the token (Tk ) to the challenge, and signs as explained in section 2, using
the (b s n) of the TrO. (tx ) could either be (tn t ) or (tx t ) for entry and exit gates re-
spectively. The user concatenates (Tk ) to the signed message and sends to the ter-
minal. The terminal verifies the signature using (Gp k ) as outlined in section 3. If
the signature is valid, the terminal checks to see if the user’s (T4) is included in the
blacklist. If it doesn’t correspond with any (T4) on the blacklist, the user is allowed to
travel otherwise the user is denied travel. Afterwards, the terminal records a T AP .
A T AP includes the challenge signed by the user, the users (Tk ), and the amount to
be charged which is determined in the accounting phase below. The blacklist check
is only needed at the entry gates.
Accounting Phase: This is a back-office process where T AP s of all users for the
day are aggregated to determine the fare to be paid by the user. The TrO sends a
payment request (payReq), which includes the (Tk ) and the amount to be charged,
to the payment network for authorisation4.
Blacklisting Phase: This phase only becomes necessary in cases where an autho-
risation fails due to insufficient funds in the user’s account. The TSP sends a trans-
action decline message to the TrO. The TrO then puts the users T4 in its blacklist
database and updates the terminals at the stations with the latest blacklist entries.
A user’s device can also be put in the blacklist in the case of compromise or a lost
device.
5.4 Proof of concept
A proof of concept was developed to test the feasibility of our proposal and also
analyse it against the requirements mentioned in section 4. A HCE-based Android
application was installed on an NFC device for the digital signature implementa-
tion. We adapted an implementation of the digital signature in [23] which was part
of an analysis of group signatures on mobile devices [24]. For the terminal, we had a
Java application using the smartcard I/O Application Programming Interface (API)
running on a PC; this acts as the terminal at a train station.
4 The payment network, acting as the TSP, translates the token back to a real PAN and au-
thorisation is processed as per normal EMV flow.
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Device Manufacturer Operating System RAM
Phone (Nexus 5) LG Electronics Android 5.1.1 (Lollipop) 2GB
Laptop Dell Windows 10 8GB
Reader ACS(ACR1281U) N/A N/A
Table 2. Devices used in Proof of Concept
5.5 Lessons learned/Considerations
Support for extended Application Protocol Data Unit (APDUs)5 on NFC devices is
still not as extensive as smart cards. Therefore most NFC devices can only send nor-
mal APDUs with a maximum length of 256bytes. We realised this is a software-based
restriction rather than the NFC controller’s inability to handle bigger messages. Due
to the size of the signature in our protocol, we modified the Android source to allow
the device to send back the signature in one APDU, rather than in chunks.
Sending a substantial amount of data over the NFC channel may not always
be efficient. Due to the size of the signature we used, we realised the time cost of
compressing the message and decompressing at the terminal’s side is trivial. We
found the BZip2 compression algorithm to be the most efficient.
Most of the parts of the signature can be precomputed; that is those parts that
do not depend on the challenge from the reader.
5.6 Performance Analysis
The total size of Si g x {{tn t /tx t ||Rn ||s t ni d } ||Tk }||Tk is 3536bytes, with a 512bit key,
plus additional 15bytes for concatenating the token to the signature in plain text.
This is compressed to 1617bytes, providing 45.7% compression.
CHALL Sign Verify Full Protocol
Average 420.75 9.92 20.5 451.17
Min 405.55 7.65 17.32 430.45
Max 445.63 10.65 23.75 480.03
Table 3. Table Showing Transaction Times In Milliseconds (ms)
We took average timings of individual processes, as well as the total time it takes
the full protocol to run over 100 iterations. The mobile device takes an average of
9.92ms to sign the challenge received from the reader and also compress the sig-
nature. The Round Trip Time (RTT), i.e. the time from when the reader sends the
challenge to when it receives the response, takes on average 420.75ms. We refer to
this as C H AL L . It is important to note that about 90% of the RTT is spent on the
5 Application Protocol Data Unit is the unit of communication between a device and a
reader. APDUs are specified in ISO/IEC 7816 be
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NFC communication link. The signature verification on the terminal side, including
decompression of the received data, takes 20.5ms on average. The whole protocol
takes on average 451.17ms.
For performance measurements of checking the blacklist, we rely on a compar-
ative study of Database Management Systems (DBMS) in [25]. Each DBMS was pop-
ulated with 1,000,000 records, and the timings for a ‘select’ query for each was taken.
The select query emulates the look up of a user’s (T4) from a blacklist database. SQL
Server was the fastest and took 18ms, while the slowest was Oracle and took 23ms.
These projections show that the delay introduced by searching a blacklisting is triv-
ial and therefore, our protocol still runs within the accepted transaction time range
for transport usage.
5.7 Requirements Analysis
We analyse our proposal against both the security and functional requirements
mentioned in section 4.3 above. Our model meets the offline verification require-
ment because the terminal is able to verify a signature, as well as run the blacklisting
function offline, i.e. without connecting to a back-office or relying on a third party.
The protocol, as shown in Table 3 above, is within the acceptable transaction speed
range, as stipulated by the efficiency requirement. It is worth noting that, currently,
NFC devices in HCE only operate at the lowest NFC data rate of 106kbps6. We found
out this limitation is also a software limitation and not the NFC controller’s inability
to operate at higher data rates. Therefore at higher rates, our solution is expected
to be much faster.
In terms of security, for a signature verified to be valid, it is computationally
hard for anyone except the group manager to reveal the identity of the actual signer.
In the random oracle model, the proof of knowledge that is part of the signature
can be proven in statistically zero knowledge. Also trying to identify a particular
signer with certificate (A, e ) requires the adversary to know if logb T1/A, l o gg T2, and
l o gg T3/g
e are equal. This is assumed to be infeasible under the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption. Therefore our protocol meets the anonymity requirement.
As shown in the key generation phase in 3.2, the group manager does not learn
any new information about the user’s private key (x), and at the end of the phase,
the GM only learns a x . Also, because (T1, T2 and T3) represent an unconditional
binding commitments to to (A and e ). This implies that if the factorization of n is
feasible, the group signature is a proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of
A/a 0 [26]. Therefore no entity, including the transport operator and the payment
network acting as the group manager, can sign a message on behalf of a user as
computing discrete logarithm is assumed to be infeasible. Therefore our protocol
thereby meets the exculpability requirement because a user cannot be framed for
a false transaction.
In addition, integrity is achieved because it is not possible for anyone without
access to the private key (x ) to generate a valid signature. Secondly, the TrO is able
to verify that the signed message includes the correct challenge it had sent, thereby
6 NFC supports data rate of 106, 212, 424, and 848kbps
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cryptographically linking the user to that point on the transport network at that
particular time. Hence creating the ‘TAP’.
User blacklisting is achieved because a legitimate user cannot avoid detection
on the blacklist by forging a false linking base. (T4) is linked with (T1) through the
proof of knowledge and also the private key x . In addition, a legitimate user cannot
repeatedly cheat the system by signing on a rogue token with a legitimate creden-
tial, because after the first payment request is declined,the TrO can blacklist the
user with the corresponding (T4).
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have looked at how a security solution – tokenisation, affects
the unique identification of users in certain scenarios. In particular, we have high-
lighted how this calls into question user blacklisting in transport ticketing. We have
shown how linkable group signatures can be used to link two transactions regard-
less of the changing token. This concept is used to create a blacklist of dishonest
users.
We have also shown the feasibility of our solution by building a proof-of-concept
which is analysed against the outlined requirements. Our solution can also be used
in use-cases outside ticketing that rely on the static nature of PANs. For example, in
retail to link different transactions of a user (with different tokens) for loyalty and
promotional purposes.
As future work, we plan to investigate more efficient methods of achieving link-
ability while maintaining anonymity. We also plan to further improve the security
of our proposed solution by implementing it on a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE).
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